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REVISITING THE RIGHT TO OFFEND FORTY
YEARS AFTER COHEN v. CALIFORNIA:




This article examines the lasting legacy of the United States
Supreme Court's ruling in Cohen v. California upon its fortieth
anniversary. After providing a primer on the case that draws from briefs
filed by both Melville Nimmer (for Robert Paul Cohen) and Michael T.
Sauer (for California), the article examines how subsequent rulings by
the nation's High Court were influenced by the logic and reasoning of
Justice Harlan's majority opinion in Cohen. The legacy, the article
illustrates, is about far more than protecting offensive expression. The
article then illustrates how lower courts, at both the state and federal
level, have used Cohen to articulate a veritable laundry list of principles
regarding First Amendment jurisprudence. The article concludes by
considering how new technologies and the digital age may affect
Cohen 's future influence, as well as how President Barack Obama's call
in January of 2011 for a more civil public discourse about political issues
stands counterposed to the First Amendment rights provided by Cohen.
Professor & Brechner Eminent Scholar in Mass Communication and Director
of the Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project at the University of Florida,
Gainesville, Fla. Visiting Professor, Spring 2011, University of the Pacific,
McGeorge School of Law, Sacramento, Cal. B.A., 1987, Communication, Stanford
University; J.D. (Order of the Coif), 1991, McGeorge School of Law, University of
the Pacific; Ph.D., 1996, Communication, Stanford University. Member, State Bar of
California. The author thanks Courtney Stokes of the University of Florida for her
review and thoughtful comments on a draft of this article.
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INTRODUCTION
In December of 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit upheld the right of Robert Norse to sue the Santa Cruz City
Council for violating his First Amendment' right of free speech when he
was ejected from a council meeting after giving its members a defiant,
but "silent, Nazi salute." 2 In concurring with this pro-speech result, Alex
Kozinski, Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit, wryly observed that one
particular council member "clearly wants Norse expelled because the
'Nazi salute' is 'against the dignity of this body and the decorum of this
body' and not because of any disruption. But, unlike der Fiihrer,
government officials in America occasionally must tolerate offensive or
irritating speech."3
Not surprisingly, this assertion coincides with Kozinski's
previous statements regarding the dangers of totalitarian-like suppression
of speech. Perhaps more importantly, in making his observation,
1. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in
pertinent part, that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press." U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press
Clauses were incorporated eighty-six years ago through the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause to apply to state and local government entities and officials. See
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
2. Norse v. City of Santa Cruz, 629 F.3d 966, 970 (9th Cir. 2010).
3. Id. at 979 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring) (emphasis added).
4. For instance, in an interview conducted in August of 2002 by the author of
this article, Judge Kozinski stated:
One of the things-not the only thing, but one of the important
things-that distinguishes us from a totalitarian government is
that people are able to speak and criticize and to raise ideas
and persuade other people. I think you lose other freedoms
when the government can do things and the people can't
criticize them. That's what happened in Nazi Germany. People
were afraid to speak. I'd like to believe that if they had a
stronger protection for speech, things would have been
different. People would have been willing to speak out if they
had protection for it, and then the people would have slowly
regained their sanity.
Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Defending the First in the Ninth: Judge
Alex Kozinski and the Freedoms of Speech and Press, 23 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REV.
259, 270 (2003).
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Kozinski cited for support5 the United States Supreme Court's 1971
opinion in Cohen v. California.6 The High Court in Cohen upheld the
right of Paul Robert Cohen to wear a jacket emblazoned with the words
"Fuck the Draft" in a Los Angeles courthouse corridor in April 1968 "as
a means of informing the public of the depth of his feelings against the
Vietnam War and the draft."7
Judge Kozinski's citation of Cohen to buttress the use of
indecorous and loutish expression is just one of many recent indicators
confirming the prophetic nature of the opening sentence of Justice John
Marshall Harlan's majority opinion: "This case may seem at first blush
too inconsequential to find its way into our books, but the issue it
presents is of no small constitutional significance."9
The fortieth anniversary of the High Court's ruling in Cohen
provides a propitious opportunity to examine the large and lasting
constitutional significance of the case and its myriad contributions to
today's First Amendment jurisprudence, some of which may not be
readily evident. That is the purpose of this article.
Part I provides a brief overview of the facts of the case, the
attorneys who litigated it, oral argument and the fractured nature of the
Supreme Court's decision.10 Importantly, Part I also blends in content
from newspaper articles written at the time of the case, along with
snippets from the briefs filed by both sides with the Court, to add richer
context beyond the Court's opinion.
Next, Part II features two sections, the first of which argues that
Cohen's reasoning and logic laid the groundwork for rulings in multiple
subsequent High Court cases." In particular, Section A of Part II
analyzes seven different Supreme Court rulings that demonstrate
Cohen's influence. Section B of Part II then illustrates that many lower
courts continue to use and interpret Cohen to support their reasoning on a
5. Norse, 629 F.3d at 979 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring) (citing Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)).
6. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
7. See id. at 16-17 (quoting People v. Cohen, I Cal. App. 3d 94, 97-98 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1969), rev'dsub nom. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)).
8. See infra Part II.B (illustrating recent uses of Cohen in lower court rulings).
9. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 15.
10. See infra notes 13-82 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 83-283 and accompanying text.
3
wide range of speech-related subjects. Finally, Part III concludes by
addressing the ways in which Cohen's legacy may be transformed in an
era of digital communication and in light of recent calls for a more civil
national political discourse following the mass shooting in Tuscon,
Arizona, which wounded a U.S. Congresswoman and killed a federal
judge, among others.12
I. A PRIMER ON COHEN
For some attorneys under the age of fifty years, there may be a
propensity to recall Cohen from a constitutional law or First Amendment
class simply as the "Fuck the Draft" case, much like the High Court's
2007 student-speech opinion in Morse v. Frederick3 may be better
known to some people as the "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS"' 4 case. But a free-
speech case, of course, involves more than just a memorable, attention-
grabbing phrase. Thus, in reflecting back on Cohen, it is useful to dig
deeper than Paul Robert Cohen's three-word message which, as First
Amendment scholar and current Furman University President Rodney
Smolla observes, "was manifestly metaphorical, as one cannot literally
perform a sexual act with a federal agency."'
Section A below thus provides a brief background on the facts,
attorneys and arguments in Cohen v. California. It assumes most law
journal readers know the basic facts of the case, and thus it focuses on
some other details that might easily be overlooked or perhaps forgotten.
Section B then provides an overview of Justice Harlan's opinion for a
five-Justice majority of the Court. Neither section is intended to be a
comprehensive history of the case; instead, each section simply tees up
the case for the analysis that follows in Part II.
12. See infra notes 284-306 and accompanying text.
13. 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
14. Id. at 397. This was the phrase at the center of Morse that was written on a
14-foot banner unfurled by Joseph Frederick, a senior at Juneau-Douglas High
School, as the Olympic Torch Relay passed by his high school on January 24, 2002.
Id.
15. Rodney A. Smolla, Content and Context: The Contributions of William
Van Alstyne to First Amendment Interpretation, 54 DUKE L.J. 1623, 1633 (2005).
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A. Prelude to the Supreme Court Ruling
This part initially articulates a few aspects of the case that are
easily overlooked when examining it only from a simplified, black-letter
law rendition of the facts. For instance, Cohen was in the Los Angeles
County Courthouse on April 26, 1968 because he had been called to
appear as a witness in a case-a fact that, as Stanford University
Professor William Cohen observes, "does not appear in the record or
court opinions."16
In addition, Paul Robert Cohen's jacket had other messages on it
besides the infamous "Fuck the Draft" statement. In particular, it was
adorned with "several peace symbols" and another three-word
declaration, "Stop the War." 7 Such additional messages, which are not
mentioned in the High Court's description of the jacket, add context to
Cohen's controversial declaration about the draft and thus support his
testimony that he wore the jacket "as a means of informing the public of
the depth of his feelings against the Vietnam War and the draft."' 9
Cohen was represented by Melville Nimmer who, as University
of Virginia Professor Robert O'Neil observes, "took on the cause as an
American Civil Liberties Union volunteer"20 at a time when he was
"known mainly as a copyright expert."21 The nation's High Court agreed
to hear the case in June 1970, with a Washington Post article devoting
only a single paragraph to the case at the time.22
16. William Cohen, A Look Back at Cohen v. California, 34 UCLA L. REV.
1595, 1596 n.7 (1987).
17. Id. at 1596.
18. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15-17 (1971) (quoting People v. Cohen,
I Cal. App. 3d 94, 97-98 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969), rev'dsub nom. Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15 (1971)) (describing Cohen's jacket).
19. Id
20. Robert M. O'Neil, Tribute: The Neglected First Amendment Jurisprudence
of the Second Justice Harlan, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 57, 65 (2001).
2 1. Id.
22. Burger Says He'll Put Law Before Precedent, WASH. PosT, June 23, 1970,
at A2 (writing that "[t]he [C]ourt agreed to consider whether it is constitutional to
base a conviction for 'disturbing the peace' on the behavior of Paul R. Cohen, who
entered the Los Angeles County Courthouse wearing a jacket bearing the inscription
'F--- the Draft').
5
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Even with the case accepted, there still was some trepidation
about whether, during oral argument, Nimmer would utter the word
"fuck" and, if so, what the reaction would be from the Justices. As
University of Chicago Professor Geoffrey R. Stone succinctly describes
the scene:
Chief Justice [Warren] Burger was very anxious
about the oral argument. In 180 years of Supreme
Court history, no one had ever uttered the word
"fuck" in the Supreme Court chamber, and Burger
was determined that it would not happen on his
watch. Thus, as Nimmer approached the podium to
begin his argument, the white-haired Burger leaned
over the bench and said, "Mr. Nimmer, . . . the
Court is thoroughly familiar with the factual setting
of this case, and it will not be necessary for you ...
to dwell on the facts." To which Nimnimer,
understanding full well the importance of saying
the word, replied, "At Mr. Chief Justice's
suggestion
... I certainly will keep very brief the statement of
facts . . . . What this young man did was to walk
through a courthouse corridor . .. wearing a jacket
upon which were inscribed the words 'Fuck the
- Draft."' 23
In his appellant brief on behalf of Paul Robert Cohen,24 Nimmer
began the "Summary of Argument" section simply by asserting that his
client "was clearly engaging in speech, and such speech is entitled to
First and Fourteenth Amendment protection because it neither contained
nor was it accompanied by any of the elements which this Court has
heretofore recognized as justifying the abridgement of freedom of
speech."25 The appellant's brief boldly contended that "[t]he fact that
23. Geoffrey R. Stone, The World of the Framers: A Christian Nation?, 56
UCLA L. REV. 1, 2 (2008) (alterations in original) (citing BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT
ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 128-29 (Simon and
Schuster, 1979)).
24. Brief for Appellant, Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (No. 70-299).
25. Id. at 8.
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Appellant's speech may have been offensive to some persons does not
justify the abridgement of his speech. The First Amendment is equally
applicable to offensive and non-offensive speech."2 6
What one might not recall is that Nimmer loaded the Brief for
Appellant not simply with facts, but with free speech theory, asserting
that "[fjundamental First Amendment [t]heory [r]equires [p]rotection for
[s]peech [s]uch as that [e]mployed by Appellant." In particular, he
argued that his client's speech should be protected because: (1) it related
to democratic self-governance; (2) allowed Paul Robert Cohen to reach
self-fulfillment and self-realization; and (3) provided "a safety valve" for
releasing steam that otherwise could result in violent conduct.28 For
practicing attorneys who may disparage the value of theory in the law,
Nimmer's brief-and the result he coaxed from the Court-illustrates its
clear relevance and importance.
Opposing Nimmer and representing California was Michael T.
Sauer, a 1962 graduate of Loyola Law School in Los Angeles who, after
''a two-year stint as a courthouse law clerk," worked for eight years as a
"deputy city attorney in Los Angeles."29 After Cohen, Sauer went on to
become a California superior court judge, drawing news media attention
in 2007 when he sentenced celebrity and hotel heiress Paris Hilton to
forty-five days in jail on charges that "she violated her probation from an
alcohol-related, reckless-driving conviction" in 2006. 30 Thus, rather than
being remembered in our pop-culturally saturated society for his
prosecution of Paul Robert Cohen or involvement in a seminal Supreme
Court ruling, "after 35 years on the bench, Sauer's name will forever be
linked with Hilton's. " 31
26. Id at 9.
27. Id at 9, 31.
28. See id. at 31-45.
29. See LA Judge in Paris Hilton Case Praised as Unflappable, Fair,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 8, 2007, available at Westlaw, 6/8/07 AP DATASTREAM
22:53:40 (providing a biography of Judge Sauer and reporting that "[i]n one of the
cases Sauer argued before the Supreme Court as a city attorney, the justices reversed
a 1968 disturbing the peace conviction against Paul Robert Cohen for appearing in a
courthouse wearing a jacket bearing a strong expletive about the military draft").
30. Tirdad Derakhshani, Party's Over: Paris Hilton Sentenced to 45 Days in
Jail, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, May 5, 2007, at C5.
31. Ashraf Khalil & J. Michael Kennedy, Unfazed by His Judgment of Paris,
L.A. TIMES, May 8, 2007, at Bl, available at Westlaw, 2007 WLNR 8792035.
7
Perhaps one of the more interesting aspects of Sauer's brief on
behalf of California was its closing use of a parade-of-horrors argument
about what surely would transpire if the Supreme Court ruled in favor of
Paul Robert Cohen.32 In particular, the Brief of Appellee asserted:
If appellant's form of protest is deemed
constitutionally protected, then one need merely
imagine the type of signs that will be publicly
displayed against private citizens. ("Fuck
Catholics"; "Fuck Negroes"; "Fuck Whites"; "Fuck
Jews";-signs carried in protest of these "groups");
against public institutions (a "Fuck the United
States Congress" sign in protest over enactments of
the National Legislature); or against public officials
(a "Fuck Nixon" sign carried by an opponent of the
war policies of the President of the United States; a
"Fuck the Justices of the United States Supreme
Court" sign displayed in protest of decisions
rendered by this Honorable Court).3 3
Ultimately, this free speech fear mongering held little sway
among a majority of the Justices. That the majority opinion, however,
with its ringing endorsement of free expression, was written by Justice
Harlan might, at first blush, seem somewhat surprising. After all, as
Professor O'Neil observes, Harlan was a "normally conservative,
erstwhile New York corporation lawyer, whose legacy is usually
recognized in areas remote from free speech and press."34 Professor
Sanford Levinson, in fact, adds that Harlan was "usually regarded as one
of the more staid justices."35 Indeed, the day after the opinion in Cohen
32. Brief of Appellee at 20-21, Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (No.
70-299).
33. Id.
34. O'Neil, supra note 20, at 57.
35. Sanford Levinson, The Pedagogy of the First Amendment: Why Teaching
About Freedom of Speech Raises Unique (and Perhaps Insurmountable) Problems
for Conscientious Teachers and Their Students, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1359, 1361
(2005).
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was delivered, the Washington Post described Harlan as "the staid
conservative who delivered the court's opinion."36
As for the current whereabouts of protagonist Paul Robert
Cohen, the author of this article e-mailed David Nimmer, a Los Angeles-
area attorney and the son of Mel Nimmer,37 in January 2011 to inquire
about his father's former client. The younger Nimmer responded, "I get
asked this from time to time - no, I'm afraid that the erstwhile First
Amendment champion has fallen off the grid. Which may be
symbolically appropriate[,] from some higher perspective."39
B. The Ruling
Reflecting on the structure of Justice Harlan's opinion, one finds
a clear and logical approach that, after a simple rendition of the facts40
and the holdings below, 4 ' and then dispensing with the jurisdictional
42
issue, began by ruling out what the case was not about. In particular,
his initial process-of-elimination strategy was to prove that the case did
36. Court Curbs Libel Claim by Individuals in News, WASH. POST, June 8,
1971, at Al.
37. David Nimmer's accolades include: Century City Bar Association
"Intellectual Property Lawyer of the Year"; Los Angeles Magazine's Southern
California "Super Lawyer" in 2006-2011; inclusion in The Best Lawyers in America
for more than 15 years; and the Los Angeles and San Francisco Daily Journals'
2008 "Top 10 Copyright Lawyers" of California. See IRELL & MANELLA LLP: David
Nimmer, http://www.irell.com/professionals-51.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
38. E-mail from author to David Nimmer, of counsel to Irell & Manella LLP
(Jan. 10, 2011, 16:50:00 PST) (on file with author).
39. E-mail from David Nimmer to author (Jan. 11, 2011, 00:47:00 PST) (on
file with author).
40. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16-17 (1971).
41. See id. (describing Cohen's conviction at the Municipal Court level in Los
Angeles, the affirmance of that conviction by the Court of Appeal of California
(Second Appellate District), and the California Supreme Court's decision not to
review the case). See also People v. Cohen, 1 Cal. App. 3d 94, 104 (Cal. Ct. App.
1969), rev'd sub nom. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (concluding that "the
evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for disturbing the peace by means of
offensive conduct as prohibited by section 415 of the Penal Code").
42. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 17-18 (discussing jurisdiction and issues not raised
in the case).
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not fall within one of the few unprotected silos of speech43 that are
sometimes referred to "categorical carve-outs."44 As Harlan put it, "[iun
order to lay hands on the precise issue which this case involves, it is
useful first to canvass various matters which this record does not
present."45
In particular, Harlan quickly dismissed the notion that the case
fell into the obscenity exception because obscenity "must be, in some
significant way, erotic." 4 6 The message on Paul Robert Cohen's jacket
was not erotic, Harlan wittily wrote, because it clearly would not
"conjure up such psychic stimulation in anyone likely to be confronted
with"47 it.
Similarly, Harlan ruled out the case coming within the confines
of the fighting words exception identified by the Supreme Court in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.48 Paul Robert Cohen's words were not
targeting any particular person and "[n]o individual actually or likely to
be present could reasonably have regarded the words on appellant's
jacket as a direct personal insult." 49 As discussed later in this article,
lower courts would find Cohen's articulation and interpretation of the
fighting words doctrine useful in their own opinions.so
43. The U.S. Supreme Court has identified several categories of speech that
fall outside the ambit of First Amendment protection. See United States v. Stevens,
_ U.S. _, _, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010) (identifying categories of
historically and traditionally unprotected content to include: (a) obscenity; (b)
defamation; (c) fraud; (d) incitement; and (e) speech integral to criminal conduct);
see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245-46 (2002) ("As a general
principle, the First Amendment bars the government from dictating what we see or
read or speak or hear. The freedom of speech has its limits; it does not embrace
certain categories of speech, including defamation, incitement, obscenity, and
pornography produced with real children.") (emphasis added).
44. Carey v. Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d 189, 199 (6th Cir. 2010).
45. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 18 (emphasis added).
46. Id. at 20.
47. Id.
48. 315 U.S. 568 (1942). In Chaplinsky, the Court defined fighting words as
"those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace." Id. at 572.
49. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20.
50. See infra Part II.B.3.
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Finally, Justice Harlan dispensed with the idea that the case fit
within the incitement-to-violence exception,5 observing that the Court
was not faced with "an instance of the exercise of the State's police
power to prevent a speaker from intentionally provoking a given group to
hostile reaction." 52 Harlan noted that there was "no showing that anyone
who saw Cohen was in fact violently aroused or that appellant intended
such a result."53
After eliminating the possibility that the facts fit within one of
these three exceptions to the First Amendment freedom of speech,
Justice Harlan concisely framed the issue before the High Court:
[T]he issue flushed by this case stands out in bold
relief. It is whether California can excise, as
"offensive conduct," one particular scurrilous
epithet from the public discourse, either upon the
theory of the court below that its use is inherently
likely to cause violent reaction or upon a more
general assertion that the States, acting as
guardians of public morality, may properly remove
this offensive word from the public vocabulary.5 4
This parsing of the issue left California with two possible
rationales to support its punishment of Paul Robert Cohen's otherwise
protected expression: (1) his speech was inherently likely to cause
violence and thus needed to be squelched; or (2) his speech breached
accepted standards of public morality and therefore could be punished.
The majority swiftly disposed of the first line of logic, reasoning that
"[w]e have been shown no evidence that substantial numbers of citizens
51. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (holding
that:
the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do
not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of
force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and
is likely to incite or produce such action).
52. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 22-23.
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are standing ready to strike out physically at whoever may assault their
sensibilities with execrations like that uttered by Cohen.""
As for the second argument, Justice Harlan began by
acknowledging it was more complicated than the first, admitting that "it
is not so obvious that the First and Fourteenth Amendments must be
taken to disable the States from punishing public utterance of this
unseemly expletive in order to maintain what they regard as a suitable
level of discourse within the body politic."5 6 But in ruling for Paul
Robert Cohen, Justice Harlan articulated a laundry list of reasons why
the First Amendment should prevail, the highlights of which are
encapsulated in the bullet point descriptions below:
* Tolerance of Offensive Expression Demonstrates Strength,
Not Weakness, in a Democratic Society: As Justice Harlan wrote, "That
the air may at times seem filled with verbal cacophony is, in this sense
not a sign of weakness but of strength," adding that "[w]e cannot lose
sight of the fact that, in what otherwise might seem a trifling and
annoying instance of individual distasteful abuse of a privilege, these
fundamental societal values are truly implicated." 57 Whether or not
Harlan's opinion was influenced by it, it will be recalled from earlier that
Mel Nimmer's appellant brief specifically launched a free speech theory
argument that his client's speech deserved protection in a democratic
58
society.
* Government Line-Drawing is Impossible When It Comes to
Defining What is and is not Offensive: Justice Harlan rhetorically
queried, "How is one to distinguish this from any other offensive
word?" 59 He also added that "while the particular four-letter word being
litigated here is perhaps more distasteful than most others of its genre, it
is nevertheless often true that one man's vulgarity is another's lyric." 6 0
This principle, of course, comports with the modern-day void for
61vagueness doctrine.
55. Id. at 23.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 25.
58. See supra notes 27-28.
59. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25.
60. Id.
61. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (observing that
"[i]t is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its
12 FIRST AMENDMENT LA W RE VIEW [Vol. 10
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* It is Necessary to Protect the Emotional Impact of Speech,
Not Simply Its Literal Meaning: Justice Harlan stressed that the facts of
the case "well illustrated" 62 the point that "that much linguistic
expression serves a dual communicative function: it conveys not only
ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise
inexpressible emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much
for their emotive as their cognitive force." 6 3 Put differently, uttering
"Fuck the Draft" deserves protection because its emotional power that an
alternative message such as "The Draft is Bad" simply cannot muster.
* Beware of the Government's Pretext of Protecting Public
Morality When the Real Aim is Viewpoint-Based Censorship:
Intimating the danger that the government might attempt to cloak its
efforts to squelch Paul Robert Cohen's anti-government viewpoint
behind the seemingly more virtuous veil of protecting morality during
the turbulent and culturally transformative Vietnam War era, Justice
Harlan wrote that "we cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can
forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk of
suppressing ideas in the process. Indeed, governments might soon seize
upon the censorship of particular words as a convenient guise for
banning the expression of unpopular views."
University of Chicago constitutional law scholar Geoffrey Stone
referred to this last argument in a 2009 article as the "pretext effect,"6 5
explaining that:
government officials will often defend their
restrictions of speech on grounds quite different
from their real motivations for the suppression,
which will often be to silence their critics and to
prohibitions are not clearly defined" such that they fail to "give the person of
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited"); see also
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES & POLICIES 941 (3d ed.
2006) ("A law is unconstitutionally vague if a reasonable person cannot tell what
speech is prohibited and what is permitted. Unduly vague laws violate due process
whether or not speech is regulated.").
62. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech in the Twenty-First Century: Ten Lessons
from the Twentieth Century, 36 PEPP. L. REv. 273, 277 (2009).
13
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suppress ideas they do not like. The pretext effect
is not unique to the realm of free speech, but it is
especially potent in this context, because public
officials will often be sorely tempted to silence
dissent in order to insulate themselves from
66
criticism and preserve their own authority.
A Self-Help Remedy, Not Censorship, is the Solution When
the Speech Occurs in a Non-Captive Audience, Public Location:
Emphasizing the contextual importance of the location of Cohen's
expression (in a public place rather than a private one), Justice Harlan
wrote that individuals "confronted with Cohen's jacket were in a quite
different posture than, say, those subjected to the raucous emissions of
sound trucks blaring outside their residences. Those in the Los Angeles
courthouse could effectively avoid further bombardment of their
sensibilities simply by averting their eyes."6
This self-help perspective actually was suggested by Mel
Nimmer during oral argument when, in responding to a query by Justice
Thurgood Marshall, Nimmer nimbly replied, "Your Honor, it was on his
jacket, which meant that a person, if he wishes to, could see it on his
jacket. But a person was not forced to continue to observe that, as in
terms of a loud noise where one can't help but hear it." 68 In other words,
the mode of expression-written versus spoken-makes a critical
contextual difference-non-captive audience versus captive audience-
in determining whether it will be protected.
Ultimately, the totality of these multiple arguments led the five-
Justice majority of Justices Harlan, William 0. Douglas, William
Brennan, Potter Stewart and Thurgood Marshall, to conclude that
California could "not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, make the simple public display here involved of this single
four-letter expletive a criminal offense." 69
In stark contrast stood a three-Justice dissent authored by Justice
Harry A. Blackmun, a Richard Nixon appointee who only recently had
66. Id.
67. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21.
68. See PETER IRONS, MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT: THE FIRST AMENDMENT 71
(Peter Irons ed., 1997) (quoting from the transcript of the oral argument).
69. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
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joined the Court,70 and joined by Chief Justice Warren Burger and
Justice Hugo Black.7' Deploying a speech-versus-conduct dichotomy in
order to foist the case outside of the realm of First Amendment
protection, Blackmun initially determined that the case was about
"mainly conduct and little speech." 7 2 He added, however, that even if the
case really was about speech, Cohen's jacket nonetheless fell within the
scope of the fighting words doctrine and thus was not protected by the
First Amendment. Openly deriding Paul Robert Cohen's wearing of the
jacket as an "absurd and immature antic," 74 and seemingly attacking the
majority's "agonizing over First Amendment values" 7 5-as if free speech
theory were seemingly irrelevant-as "misplaced and unnecessary, 76it
seems fair to characterize Justice Blackmun's brief dissent, at least to this
point, as curt, if not completely caustic.
Justice Blackmun, however, added a second line of reasoning to
his dissent-a line of reasoning in which Justice Byron White
concurred.77 Blackmun contended that if the High Court did not dismiss
the case against Paul Robert Cohen, then it should be remanded to be
considered in light of the California Supreme Court's ruling in In re
Bushman. Bushman also dealt with the constitutionality and
interpretation of the same California Penal Code section under which
Paul Robert Cohen was prosecuted, but it was handed down after the
70. See Stephen L. Wasby, Justice Blackmun and Criminal Justice: A Modest
Overview, 28 AKRON L. REV. 125, 125 (1995) (noting that "Blackmun was
nominated for a position on the Supreme Court in 1970 by President Richard M.
Nixon," and adding that "[a]lthough Blackmun was not irredeemably conservative
and there were some issues, such as exclusion of minorities from juries, on which he
was consistently liberal throughout his Court tenure, he remained pretty much a law-
and-order justice").






77. See id. at 28 (writing that Justice White "concurs in Paragraph 2 of Mr.
Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion").
78. 463 P.2d 727 (Cal. 1970).
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California high court declined to review the California appellate court's
affirmance7 9 of Cohen's conviction.8
When the ruling came down, the New York Times devoted
merely one scant paragraph to the decision, writing simply that the
Court:
Ruled, 5 to 4, that California violated the
Constitution's free speech guarantee when it
convicted a young man of "offensive conduct" for
wearing a jacket inscribed on the back with a four-
letter vulgarism denouncing the draft. (No. 299,
Cohen v. California). Dissenting: Burger,
Blackmun, Black, White.
The opinion, of course, would turn out to occupy much more
82
space in constitutional law casebookS and, as this article describes in
the next part, it would influence First Amendment jurisprudence at both
the High Court and lower court levels for years to come.
II. THE LASTING INFLUENCE OF COHEN:
FROM SUPREME COURT DECISIONS TO RECENT LOWER COURT RULINGS
This part has two sections. Section A initially illustrates Cohen's
influence on seven major Supreme Court opinions handed down over the
past forty years. Section B then turns to lower court rulings, both recent
and of older vintage, that have been influenced and shaped in some
manner by the logic and reasoning of Justice Harlan's majority opinion
in Cohen.
79. People v. Cohen, 1 Cal. App. 3d 94 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969), rev'd sub nom.
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
80. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 28 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Inasmuch as this
Court does not dismiss this case, it ought to be remanded to the California Court of
Appeal for reconsideration in the light of the subsequently rendered decision by the
State's highest tribunal in Bushman.").
81. Supreme Court's Actions, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1971, at A16.
82. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1201-04 (6th
ed. 2009) (setting forth an edited version of Cohen).
16 FIRST AMENDMENT LA W RE VIEW [Vol. 10
2011] REVISITING THE RIGHT TO OFFEND
A. Cohen's Influence on Subsequent Supreme Court Rulings: A Septet
of Critical Cases Across a Range ofIssues
While the Supreme Court's decision in Cohen has influenced
many of the High Court's later rulings not included in the discussion
below, this section concentrates on seven different cases. They are
selected because they highlight or illustrate the different ways in which
Cohen is influential on modern-day First Amendment jurisprudence. In
some instances, the cases explicitly cite Cohen, while in others it is the
logic and reasoning of the High Court that closely tracks or mirrors
Cohen, despite the lack of any direct citation to it. The seven cases are
discussed in chronological order, starting with the oldest of the opinions.
1. Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation"
In 1978, the Supreme Court cited Cohen to support its decision
affirming the Federal Communications Commission's power to fine
over-the-air radio and television broadcasters when they transmit explicit
83. See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, U.S. , _, 130 S.
Ct. 2705, 2724 (2010) (using Cohen to illustrate the point that, when a generally
applicable regulation that targets conduct also has the effect of restricting speech,
more rigorous First Amendment scrutiny is applied beyond that of the intermediate
scrutiny standard); FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. _, _, 129 S.
Ct. 1800, 1829 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Cohen's language about the
emotive function of speech to support the proposition that "[s]pontaneous utterances
used simply to convey an emotion or intensify a statement fall within" the sweep of
an FCC order targeting indecency) (emphasis added); Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209-11 (1975) (addressing the constitutionality of a
local ordinance that prohibited showing films containing nudity by a drive-in movie
theater when its screen was visible from a public street or place, and quoting Cohen
for the proposition that "the burden normally falls upon the viewer to 'avoid further
bombardment of [his] sensibilities simply by averting [his] eyes"' and adding, under
Cohen-like logic, that "the Constitution does not permit government to decide which
types of otherwise protected speech are sufficiently offensive to require protection
for the unwilling listener or viewer"); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107 (1973) (per
curiam) (citing Cohen when considering the scope of both obscenity and the fighting
words doctrine, and noting that, after Cohen, to classify the phrase "We'll take the
fucking street later" as obscene "would not be tenable").
84. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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content that is indecent,85 yet not obscene,86 during specific times of the
day when children are likely to be in the audience.87 In particular, the
Court cited Cohen to illustrate "[t]he importance of context"88 in which
speech occurs in order to determine if its censorship and punishment are
justified. In a nutshell, Pacifica Foundation made it clear that Cohen
would not always protect offensive speech - any time, any where - but
rather that it would be limited in its lasting effect by its specific factual
pattern.
Thus, in classic compare-and-contrast fashion, Justice John Paul
Stevens explained for the majority in Pacifica Foundation that:
[i]n holding that criminal sanctions could not be
imposed on Cohen for his political statement in a
public place, the Court rejected the argument that
his speech would offend unwilling viewers; it
noted that "there was no evidence that persons
powerless to avoid [his] conduct did in fact object
to it." In contrast, in this case the Commission was
responding to a listener's strenuous complaint, and
Pacifica does not question its determination that
85. The FCC today defines indecent content as "language or material that, in
context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory
organs or activities." Federal Communications Commission, Obscene, Indecent and
Profane Broadcasts, FFC Consumer Facts, 1, http://transition.fcc.gov/cgb/
consumerfacts/obscene.pdf. The FCC specifies on its website that "[i]ndecent
programming contains patently offensive sexual or excretory material that does not
rise to the level of obscenity." Id.
86. Obscenity is one of the few categories of expression that is not protected
by the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech. See Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (writing that "obscenity is not within the area of
constitutionally protected speech or press"). The Supreme Court's current three-part
test for obscenity asks the factfinder to determine if the material in question: (1)
"appeals to a prurient interest" in sex, when taken as a whole and as judged by
"contemporary community standards" from the perspective of the average person;
(2) is "patently offensive," as defined by state law; and (3) "lacks serious literary,
artistic, political or scientific value." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
87. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750-51 (1978).
88. Id. at 747 n.25.
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this afternoon broadcast was likely to offend
listeners.89
The offending message in Cohen was protected, in large part,
because of what the author of this article refers to as the three "p"
contextual factors. In particular, they are:
* political in content;
* public in location; and
* passive (written, rather than spoken) in conveyance.
Elaborating on this trio of contextual factors, the Court wrote in
Cohen that:
persons confronted with Cohen's jacket were in a
quite different posture than, say, those subjected to
the raucous emissions of sound trucks blaring
outside their residences. Those in the Los Angeles
courthouse could effectively avoid further
bombardment of their sensibilities simply by
averting their eyes. And, while it may be that one
has a more substantial claim to a recognizable
privacy interest when walking through a
courthouse corridor than, for example, strolling
through Central Park, surely it is nothing like the
interest in being free from unwanted expression in
the confines of one's own home.90
Seven years later, in Pacifica Foundation, it was of great
concern to the High Court that the offending speech in question could
intrude into "the privacy of the home, where the individual's right to be
left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder." 9'
Furthermore, the fact that the speech in Pacifica Foundation was active
(spoken) rather than passive (written) made a critical difference, with the
Court noting the danger of George Carlin's comedic recording for "those
too young to read. Although Cohen's written message might have been
incomprehensible to a first grader, Pacifica's broadcast could have
89. Id. (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,22 (1971)).
90. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21-22 (1971).
91. Pacifica Found, 438 U.S. at 748 (citing Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397
U.S. 728 (1970)).
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enlarged a child's vocabulary in an instant."92 In brief, the complete
context of speech-its content, location and mode-all affect the amount
of First Amendment protection it receives. Pacifica Foundation thus
made it clear that Cohen did not protect all profanity-any time, any
manner and anywhere-but, instead, was much more limited by its
factual context.
The bottom line here is laced with irony-a profoundly pro-
speech decision in Cohen was used to justify the punishment of
expression in Pacifica Foundation. Yet the most profound irony resulting
from this contextual-based approach to speech protection may be yet to
come.
In particular, the Supreme Court in Pacifica Foundation, directly
citing Cohen, wrote that the value of speech and its capacity to offend
"vary with the circumstances. Words that are commonplace in one
setting are shocking in another. To paraphrase Justice Harlan, one
occasion's lyric is another's vulgarity." 93 The paraphrase, of course, is to
Justice Harlan's observation in Cohen that:
while the particular four-letter word being litigated
here is perhaps more distasteful than most others of
its genre, it is nevertheless often true that one
man's vulgarity is another's lyric. Indeed, we think
it is largely because governmental officials cannot
make principled distinctions in this area that the
Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so
largely to the individual.94
This language from Cohen taps directly into the problem of
vagueness at the heart of California's statutory attempt to punish Paul
Robert Cohen for "offensive conduct." 9 5 In other words, while the word
"fuck" may be offensive to some people, it may not be so for others
because it ultimately boils down to a matter of individual "taste and
style."96 A statute that attempts to punish "offensive" speech thus is
92. Id. at 749-50 (noting the easy access children have to broadcasting, the
government's interest in the well-being of its youth, and the parent's claim to
authority in their own home).
93. Id. at 747.
94. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25 (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 16.
96. Id. at 25.
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inherently vague because, when it comes to the potential of language to
offend, "governmental officials cannot make principled distinctions." 9 7
As the Court rhetorically queried in Cohen, "How is one to distinguish
this from any other offensive word?"98
The irony is that the FCC's indecency regime that was sustained
in Pacifica Foundation in 1978 now teeters in 2011 on what could be the
brink of its demise precisely due to the exact same type of vagueness
issues that troubled California's statute in Cohen. Specifically, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled in 2010 in
Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission99
that "the FCC's policy violates the First Amendment because it is
unconstitutionally vague, creating a chilling effect that goes far beyond
the fleeting expletives at issue here." 00 In holding that "the FCC's
indecency policy is unconstitutional because it is impermissibly
vague,,,toI the Second Circuit reasoned that "[t]he first problem arises in
the FCC's determination as to which words or expressions are patently
offensive. For instance, while the FCC concluded that 'bullshit' in a
'NYPD Blue' episode was patently offensive, it concluded that 'dick'
and 'dickhead' were not."' 02
In other words, just as California's statute targeting offensive
conduct was so vague as to prevent principled distinctions from being
made between certain words,103 so too is the FCC's current definition of
indecency targeting patently offensive content so vague as to prevent its
enforcement. Thus, in hindsight, Justice Stevens' invocation and
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. 613 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted in part, U.S. _, 131 S.
Ct. 3065 (2011).
100. Id. at 319.
101. Id. at 327.
102. Id. at 330 (emphasis added). In August of 2010, the FCC petitioned the
Second Circuit for a rehearing of the case. See Ted Johnson, FCC Battles for
Control, DAILY VARIETY, Aug. 27, 2010, at 1, 60 (calling the filing of the appeal
"the clearest acknowledgement yet by the Federal Communications Commission that
its ability to restrict indecent content may be in jeopardy, particularly if the case
lands in the Supreme Court," and adding that "[t]he FCC request for a rehearing,
rather than an appeal directly to the Supreme Court, essentially buys time in a legal
battle that may very well end up at the high court anyway").
103. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
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paraphrase in Pacifica Foundation of Cohen's "one man's vulgarity is
another's lyric"' line of logic to support the FCC's regulation of
indecency may not have been so wise or prudent after all because the
same reasoning could result in the downfall of the Commission's current
authority over indecent expression.
2. Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser05
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court dealt a blow to the
First Amendment speech rights of public school students when it held in
Bethel School District v. Fraser that school officials may punish students
for engaging in sexually lewd, vulgar and indecent speech. o0 In chipping
away at the student speech rights it had recognized seventeen years
earlier in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District,107 the Court in Fraser used Cohen much as it did in Pacifica
Foundation-as a compare-and-contrast foil for illustrating that
contextual cues are largely determinative of the extent of protection
speech receives.
In Fraser, the critical contextual factors included: (1) the content
of the speech (sexual rather than political); (2) the location of the speech
(in school rather than out of school); and (3) the nature of the audience
toward whom the speech is directed (minors rather than adults).
Specifically, the Court wrote:
104. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
105. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
106. The Court opined in Fraser that:
[t]he First Amendment does not prevent the school officials
from determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such
as respondent's would undermine the school's basic
educational mission. A high school assembly or classroom is
no place for a sexually explicit monologue directed towards an
unsuspecting audience of teenage students. Accordingly, it was
perfectly appropriate for the school to disassociate itself to
make the point to the pupils that vulgar speech and lewd
conduct is wholly inconsistent with the "fundamental values"
of public school education.
Id. at 685-86.
107. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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The First Amendment guarantees wide freedom in
matters of adult public discourse. A sharply divided
Court upheld the right to express an antidraft
viewpoint in a public place, albeit in terms highly
offensive to most citizens. See Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15 (1971). It does not follow, however,
that simply because the use of an offensive form of
expression may not be prohibited to adults making
what the speaker considers a political point, the
same latitude must be permitted to children in a
public school.0
While simultaneously using Cohen as a counterpoint against
which to contrast the facts in Fraser and thereby to justify the school's
punishment of Matthew Fraser for giving a speech laden with sexual
innuendoes during a high school assembly, Chief Justice Burger's
majority opinion also appears to somewhat subtly undermine the
importance of Cohen as precedent by referring to it as the product of a
"sharply divided Court." 10 Although accurate regarding the fractured
nature of the Cohen Court,"' deployment of the phrase "sharply divided"
might have been a rhetorical attempt to limit the power of Justice
Harlan's majority opinion.
In a very real sense, then, Chief Justice Burger in Fraser cabins
and confines the scope of Cohen only to cases involving political speech
that is made in public places and that plays a role in "adult public
discourse."ll2 Read more broadly, the majority in Fraser uses Cohen as a
tool to draw a clear dichotomy between the rights of adults and children
when it comes to the use of offensive language, with Burger quoting a
108. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682.
109. In nominating a classmate, Jeff Kuhlman, for a student-government
office, "Fraser referred to his candidate in terms of an elaborate, graphic, and explicit
sexual metaphor." Id. at 677-78. Among other things, Fraser stated, "Kuhlman is a
man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll take an issue and nail it
to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts-he drives hard, pushing and pushing
until finally-he succeeds." Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
110. Id. at 682 (majority opinion).
111. See supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text (describing the breakdown
of the Justices and opinions in Cohen).
112. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682.
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lower court opinion approvingly for the proposition that "the First
Amendment gives a high school student the classroom right to wear
Tinker's armband, but not Cohen's jacket."' 13
In his concurring opinion, however, Justice William Brennan
relied on Cohen to make it clear that location-not the age of the
speaker-was the determinative contextual factor in Fraser. Brennan
wrote that if Matthew Fraser "had given the same speech outside of the
school environment, he could not have been penalized simply because
government officials considered his language to be inappropriate . . .
[T]he Court's opinion does not suggest otherwise."" 4
Justice Brennan's point, in fact, would bear fruit decades later in
the Supreme Court's 2007 student speech case of Morse v. Frederick. 1s
Writing the opinion of the Court in Morse, Chief Justice John Roberts
noted that "[h]ad Fraser delivered the same speech in a public forum
outside the school context, it would have been protected." 1 6
The bottom line, whether it be Chief Justice Burger's majority
opinion or Justice Brennan's concurrence, is that Cohen helped to
provide a contextual, comparison point for the Supreme Court in Fraser
in defining the extent of the in-school speech rights of minors.
3. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell 117
Seventeen years after the Supreme Court in Cohen affirmed First
Amendment protection against criminal penalties for engaging in
offensive speech critical of government policies (namely, the draft and
the war in Vietnam), it extended First Amendment protection against tort
liability" 8 for engaging in offensive, hyperbolic speech critical of public
figures and public officials. 9
113. Id. (quoting Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d
1043, 1057 (2d Cir. 1979) (Newman, J., concurring)).
114. Id. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15 (1971)).
115. 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
116. Id. at 405 (citing Cohen, 403 U.S. 15).
117. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
118. The tort at issue in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell was intentional infliction
of emotional distress. See id at 48 (framing the issue as whether an award of
damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress "is consistent with the First
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Although the Supreme Court in Falwell never once directly cites
it, Cohen arguably lays the foundation for Falwell in three key ways.
First, the speech in both cases was not meant to be taken literally. As
noted earlier, the speech of Paul Robert Cohen "was manifestly
metaphorical, as one cannot literally perform a sexual act with a federal
agency."l20 Likewise, the speech at issue in Falwell was labeled as an ad
parody.121
Second, just as Paul Robert Cohen could have engaged in more
genteel speech by scrawling "I object to the draft" on his jacket rather
than "Fuck the Draft," so too could Hustler and its controversial
publisher, Larry Claxton Flynt,122 have expressed the more refined
sentiment, "Jerry Falwell is a hypocrite who does not believe what he
preaches." Instead, Flynt chose to, bluntly and much more abrasively, put
the following words in the mouth of Jerry Falwell during the course of a
fictional interview about his first time having sex: "I always get sloshed
before I go out to the pulpit. You don't think I could lay down all that
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution"). Intentional
infliction of emotional distress typically "consists of four elements: (1) the
defendant's conduct must be intentional or reckless, (2) the conduct must be
outrageous and intolerable, (3) the defendant's conduct must cause the plaintiff
emotional distress[,] and (4) the distress must be severe." Karen Markin, The Truth
Hurts: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress as a Cause of Action Against the
Media, 5 CoMM. L. & POL'Y 469, 476 (2000).
119. Although the case did not involve a public official, the Court nonetheless
concluded in Falwell that:
public figures and public officials may not recover for the tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of
publications such as the one here at issue without showing in
addition that the publication contains a false statement of fact
which was made with "actual malice," i.e,, with knowledge
that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to
whether or not it was true.
Falwell, 485 U.S. at 56 (emphases added).
120. Smolla, supra note 15, at 1633.
121. See Falwell, 485 U.S. at 48.
122. See generally Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Larry Flynt
Uncensored: A Dialogue with the Most Controversial Man in First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 9 CoMMLAW CONSPECTUS 159 (2001) (providing biographical
information on Larry Flynt and the content of an in-depth, in-person interview
conducted with him in December 2000 in his Beverly Hills, California office).
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bullshit sober, do you?"l2 3 University of Virginia Professor Frederick
Schauer recently referred to the speech of both Paul Robert Cohen and
Larry Flynt by the same derisive, shorthand moniker-"juvenile
.. . ,,124criticism.
For Flynt, who seemingly has a made it a primary life goal to
expose and ridicule individuals in public life and politics whom he
perceives to be hypocrites,125 the use of such juvenile mocking and
profanity-the term bullshit-was a powerful way of conveying his
message that Jerry Falwell was a hypocrite. The Supreme Court's
support for such blunt, candid and shocking talk stems from Cohen's
recognition "that much linguistic expression serves a dual
communicative function"1 2 6 and that:
words are often chosen as much for their emotive
as their cognitive force. We cannot sanction the
view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the
cognitive content of individual speech, has little or
no regard for that emotive function which,
practically speaking, may often be the more
important element of the overall message sought to
be communicated.12 7
Third and finally, Cohen arguably lays the groundwork for the
Falwell Court's recognition that subjectivity in the meaning and
interpretation of language prevents the government, at least in some
cases, from drawing clear lines that separate protected from unprotected
128
expression. Specifically, for the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress ("IIED") at issue in Falwell, a key element is the
123. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, MedLibrary.org, http://medlibrary.org
/medwiki/Hustler Magazine v. Falwell#Extemal Links (last visited Oct. 27, 2011)
(setting forth the text of the ad parody).
124. Frederick Schauer, Abandoning the Guidance Function: Morse v.
Frederick, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 205, 212 n.24 (2007).
125. See generally Clay Calvert, Democracy & the Discourse of Distrust:
Explicating the Hypocrisy Exposition Value in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 32
T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 177, 177-80 (2010) (describing Flynt's efforts to out
hypocrites); See id. at 177 (quoting LARRY FLYNT, SEX, LIES & POLITICS: THE
NAKED TRUTH XVI (2004)) ("I'm an opponent of hypocrisy, not sex.").
126. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
127. Id.
128. See infra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
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outrageousness of the conduct or the speech of the defendant. Yet
Chief Justice William Rehnquist reasoned in Falwell:
"Outrageousness" in the area of political and social
discourse has an inherent subjectiveness about it
which would allow a jury to impose liability on the
basis of the jurors' tastes or views, or perhaps on
the basis of their dislike of a particular expression.
An "outrageousness" standard thus runs afoul of
our longstanding refusal to allow damages to be
awarded because the speech in question may have
an adverse emotional impact on the audience.'30
This reasoning parallels the Court's observation seventeen years
before in Cohen that it is "often true that one man's vulgarity is another's
lyricm and its related rhetorical query, "How is one to distinguish this
from any other offensive word?"1 32 In brief, the Cohen Court's problems
with the amorphous term "offensive" in the California statute at issue in
that case undergird the Falwell Court's troubles with the equally
nebulous concept of outrageousness in the IIED tort.
Ultimately, in comparison with both Pacifica Foundation and
Fraser in which Cohen was used as a counterfactual foil to justify the
punishment of speech, Falwell tracks Cohen's logic and reasoning in a
trio of different ways to deliver a free speech victory.
4. Texas v. Johnsonl33
In 1989, a fractured Supreme Court upheld the First Amendment
right of citizens to burn the American flag as a form of symboliC134
129. See Hustler Magazine, Inc., v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988)
(considering it "quite understandable that most if not all jurisdictions have chosen to
make it civilly culpable where the conduct in question is sufficiently 'outrageous"')
(emphasis added).
130. Id. at 55.
131. Cohen, 403 U.S. at25.
132. Id.
133. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
134. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (observing that "the First
Amendment affords protection to symbolic or expressive conduct as well as to actual
speech").
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political expression.'35 If Cohen laid the groundwork for protecting the
"emotive function"' 3 6 of speech, particularly when engaged in at a public
venue where onlookers have a lesser expectation of privacy,' 37 then
Gregory Lee Johnson took full advantage of it when he burned an
American flag outside of the 1984 Republican Party Convention just as
President Ronald Reagan was being re-nominated.138 While Paul Robert
Cohen used the word "fuck" to demonstrate the depths of his feelings
about the draft and war in Vietnam,139 Johnson torched a flag because, in
his words, "a more powerful statement of symbolic speech, whether you
agree with it or not, couldn't have been made at that time. It's quite a just
position [juxtaposition]. We had new patriotism and no patriotism." 4 0
Thus, while "fuck" is a powerful word that Cohen exploited, the
American flag has what Justice Brennan characterized as a "uniquely
persuasive power"'41 that Johnson exploited.
Cohen and Johnson are linked, statutorily speaking, by the
concept of offense and, judicially speaking, by the Court's rejection of
offense taken at a particular viewpoint as sufficient grounds for
criminally punishing an individual. Specifically, while the California
statute under which Paul Robert Cohen was prosecuted targeted
"offensive conduct," 42 the Texas statute under which Gregory Lee
135. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 399 (writing that "[a]fter publicly burning an
American flag as a means of political protest, Gregory Lee Johnson was convicted of
desecrating a flag in violation of Texas law. This case presents the question whether
his conviction is consistent with the First Amendment. We hold that it is not.").
136. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
137. See id. at 21-22 (noting that "while it may be that one has a more
substantial claim to a recognizable privacy interest when walking through a
courthouse corridor than, for example, strolling through Central Park, surely it is
nothing like the interest in being free from unwanted expression in the confines of
one's own home").
138. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406.
139. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16 (noting that Paul Robert Cohen "'testified that
he wore the jacket knowing that the words were on the jacket as a means of
informing the public of the depth of his feelings against the Vietnam War and the
draft' (quoting People v. Cohen, 1 Cal. App. 3d 94, 97-98 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969),
rev'dsub nom. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971))).
140. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406.
141. Id. at 420.
142. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16 (observing that "Cohen was convicted in the
Los Angeles Municipal Court of violating that part of California Penal Code § 415
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Johnson was charged targeted burning a flag "in a way that the actor
knows will seriously offend one or more persons likely to observe or
discover his action."' But just as Justice Harlan in Cohen recognized
that the government cannot "force persons [such as Paul Robert Cohen]
who wish to ventilate their dissident views into avoiding particular forms
of expression"m simply because they might offend or lead to violence,
Justice Brennan in Johnson reasoned that a major "function of free
speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may
indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest,
creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to
anger.", 4 5 Cohen and Johnson thus represent triumphs for the right of
speakers to provocatively spark dissent and, concomitantly, defeats for
the right of audience members to be free from offense.
Justice David Souter thus would use Cohen, more than a dozen
years after Johnson built upon this line of logic, to support the
proposition that "merely protecting listeners from offense at the message
is not a legitimate interest of the government."46
Furthermore, there is another way in which Cohen arguably lays
the groundwork for part of the majority's reasoning in Johnson.
Specifically, Cohen may be read as an opinion premised on what this
article calls a strength-through-tolerance rationale, with the Court
writing in Cohen that the fact that:
the air may at times seem filled with verbal
cacophony is . . . not a sign of weakness but of
strength. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, in
what otherwise might seem a trifling and annoying
instance of individual distasteful abuse of a
which prohibits 'maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace or quiet of any
neighborhood or person . . . by . . . offensive conduct . . . ."') Id. (quoting CAL.
PENAL CODE § 415 (West 1970) (repealed and reenacted 1974)) (emphasis
added)).
143. Johnson, 491 U.S. a400 n.l (emphasis added).
144. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 23.
145. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 408-09 (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S.
1, 4 (1949)).
146. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 455 (2002)
(Souter, J., dissenting).
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privilege, these fundamental societal values are
truly implicated. 147
In Johnson, the air was literally filled with the flames of a stolen
American flag,' 48 but Justice Brennan opined that:
the flag's deservedly cherished place in our
community will be strengthened, not weakened, by
our holding today. Our decision is a reaffirmation
of the principles of freedom and inclusiveness that
the flag best reflects, and of the conviction that our
toleration of criticism such as Johnson's is a sign
and source of our strength.14 9
When read collectively, the decisions in Cohen and Johnson thus
embrace First Amendment scholar Lee Bollinger's notion of a "tolerant
society,"' 0 or one in which extreme and offensive views are tolerated.
As an example, Bollinger asserts that protecting the expression of Nazi
beliefs is pivotal because it reinforces American society's commitment to
tolerance.15 ' Bollinger writes, "free speech involves a special act of
carving out one area of social interaction for extraordinary self-restraint,
the purpose of which is to develop and demonstrate a social capacity to
control feelings evoked by a host of social encounters." 52
5. R.A. V v. City of St. Paul53
The Supreme Court in 1992 held that a St. Paul, Minnesota
disorderly conduct ordinance targeting cross burning done with
knowledge that it will cause "anger, alarm or resentment in others on the
147. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25.
148. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 399 (noting that Johnson burned "an American
flag handed to him by a fellow protestor who had taken it from a flagpole outside
one of the targeted buildings").
149. Id. at 419 (emphasis added).
150. LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986).
151. Lee C. Bollinger, The Skokie Legacy: Reflections on an "Easy Case" and
Free Speech Theory, 80 MICH. L. REV. 617, 629-31 (1982).
152. BOLLINGER, supra note 150, at 10.
153. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender"l 54 was "facially
unconstitutional in that it prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on
the basis of the subjects the speech addresses." 15
In concurring with the opinion of the Court, Justice Byron White
cited Cohen to support the proposition that "[tihe mere fact that
expressive activity causes hurt feelings, offense, or resentment does not
render the expression unprotected."1 56 Because the St. Paul ordinance
made "criminal expressive conduct that causes only hurt feelings,
offense, or resentment,"l 57 Justice White, joined in full by Justices Harry
Blackmun and Sandra Day O'Connor and in part by Justice John Paul
Stevens, concluded it was "fatally overbroad and invalid on its face." 5 1
Cohen also is cited in R.A. V to illustrate the Court's gradual
limiting of the scope of the fighting words doctrine after Chaplinsky. In
particular, Justice Stevens deploys Cohen in his concurring opinion to
support the statement that "we have consistently construed the 'fighting
words' exception set forth in Chaplinsky narrowly." 59 As illustrated later
in this article, lower courts also have used Cohen when they attempt to
define the ambit of fighting words.160
It will be recalled that in Cohen, Justice Harlan began his attempt
to frame the issue by ruling out what the case was not about, and fighting
words was one of those unprotected categories of speech into which
Harlan determined the facts in Cohen did not fit.161
6. Hill v. Coloradol62
In 2000, the Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of a
Colorado statute that restricted the speech rights of anti-abortion
154. See id. at 380 (quoting the complete terms of the ordinance).
155. Id. at 381.
156. Id. at 414 (White, J., concurring) (citing, among other cases, Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971)).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 428 (Stevens, J., concurring).
160. See infra Part I1.B.3.
161. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
162. 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
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protestors "within 100 feet of the entrance to any health care facility" 63
by prohibiting them from knowingly approaching "another person within
eight feet of such person, unless such other person consents, for the
purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or
engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling with such other
person."1M
Much as Cohen, and later, Johnson,165 pitted the First
Amendment right of speakers against the audience's right to avoid
offensive and unwanted expression, the issue framed in Hill by the
Supreme Court was "whether the First Amendment rights of the speaker
are abridged by the protection the statute provides for the unwilling
listener."1 66 In determining if the Colorado statute struck "an acceptable
balance between the constitutionally protected rights of law-abiding
speakers and the interests of unwilling listeners,"167 the Court turned to
Cohen to suggest that the right to engage in offensive and unwanted
expression is highly fact specific and dependent upon the context in
which the speech is used.168
Quoting Cohen, Justice Stevens wrote for the Hill majority that
"[t]he recognizable privacy interest in avoiding unwanted
communication varies widely in different settings. It is far less important
when 'strolling through Central Park' than when 'in the confines of one's
own home,' or when persons are 'powerless to avoid' it."6 As with its
earlier decisions in Pacifica Foundationl70 and Fraser 1 discussed
above, the Court in Hill made it clear that Cohen did not create an
unlimited or absolute right to engage in offensive expression, but rather a
qualified right that is bounded and confined by contextual factors.
In particular, one of the contextual factors the Court in Hill
emphasized was whether or not the unwilling audience members and
recipients of the speech could effectively exercise a self-help remedy of
163. Id. at 707.
164. Id. at 707 n.1.
165. See supra Part II.A.4.
166. Hill, 530 U.S. at 708.
167. Id. at 714.
168. Id. at 716.
169. Id. (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1971)).
170. See supra Part II.A.1.
171. See supra Part II.A.2.
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avoiding the speech or, in contrast, whether they were captive audiences
unable to escape the speech. Once again quoting Cohen, Justice Stevens
wrote that "[e]ven in a public forum, one of the reasons we tolerate a
protester's right to wear a jacket expressing his opposition to government
policy in vulgar language is because offended viewers can 'effectively
avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their
eyes."'l72 In other words, one can simply look away from a written
message like Paul Robert Cohen's distasteful phrase if one so chooses.
But unlike in Cohen, the unwilling audience members in Hill
were attempting to do more than just avoid speech; they were attempting
to access a medical facility with unobstructed passage and, as such, could
not avoid the messages.173 Cohen thus becomes a counter-factual foil, as
it was in Fraser,174 both because the degree of captivity, as it were, in
Hill was greater and because an additional right-a right of access to
medical facility-was at stake. As Justice Stevens wrote:
The purpose of the Colorado statute is not to
protect a potential listener from hearing a particular
message. It is to protect those who seek medical
treatment from the potential physical and emotional
harm suffered when an unwelcome individual
delivers a message (whatever its content) by
physically approaching an individual at close
range, i.e., within eight feet. In offering protection
from that harm, while maintaining free access to
heath clinics, the State pursues interests
constitutionally distinct from the freedom from
unpopular speech. . . .17
The majority ultimately affirmed the Colorado Supreme Court's
decision upholding the constitutionality of the statute.
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Clarence Thomas,
Justice Antonin Scalia deployed Cohen to suggest the Colorado statute
172. Hill, 530 U.S. at 716 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. at 21).
173. Id. at 717-18.
174. See supra Part IL.A.2.
175. Hill, 530 U.S. at 718 n.25.
176. Id. at 735.
was unconstitutional.n7 7 "[W]e have never made the absurd suggestion
that a pedestrian is a 'captive' of the speaker who seeks to address him
on the public sidewalks, where he may simply walk quickly by," Scalia
wrote, quoting Cohen's logic that "the burden normally falls upon the
viewer to 'avoid further bombardment of [his] sensibilities simply by
averting [his] eyes."'" 78 In a separate dissent, Justice Anthony Kennedy
also cited Cohen as militating against the statute's constitutionality,
writing that citizens in a public venue typically "bear the burden of
disregarding unwelcome messages."1 79  Kennedy thus ultimately
concluded that "[g]iven our traditions with respect to open discussion in
public fora, this statute, which sweeps so largely on First Amendment
freedoms, cannot be sustained." 80
Hill thus also demonstrates that Cohen can be interpreted in
multiple ways within the same case and used selectively by Justices to
justify either majority or dissenting opinions. For the majority in Hill,
Cohen was a counter-factual foil, while for dissenters Scalia and
Kennedy, it provided a point of similar comparison.
7. Lawrence v. Texas'8
In 2003, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a Texas
anti-sodomy statute targeting same-sex couplesl82 and, in the process,
overruled its 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick' that had upheld a
. . 184
similar Georgia statute. In writing the majority opinion in Lawrence v.
177. Id. at 753 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
178. Id. (quoting Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11
(1975)).
179. Id at 772 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 779-80.
181. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
182. See id at 581 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (observing that
"[s]odomy between opposite-sex partners, however, is not a crime in Texas. That is,
Texas treats the same conduct differently based solely on the participants. Those
harmed by this law are people who have a same-sex sexual orientation and thus are
more likely to engage in behavior prohibited .... ).
183. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 ("Bowers
was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to
remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled.").
184. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566.
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Texas, Justice Kennedy opened by reasoning that "[fjreedom extends
beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that
includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate
conduct."' 8 '
This assertion explicitly bridges the freedoms of speech and
intimate sexual conduct as fundamental liberties that demand individual
autonomy. It is a point to which Kennedy would return later in
Lawrence, writing that "[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in
intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one
element in a personal bond that is more enduring."' Engaging in a
certain act of sexual conduct, in other words, is a form of symbolic
expression -an expression not only of one's sexual identity and
preference, but also of a bond with another person.
In addition, Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lawrence
rejected the notion that the government can use morality as a sufficient
justification to suppress intimate sexual conduct between consenting
adults. In particular, she wrote that "[m]oral disapproval of a group
cannot be a legitimate governmental interest,"' 88 thus rebuffing Texas'
argument that its anti-sodomy statute "furthers the legitimate
governmental interest of the promotion of morality."' 89 O'Connor
reinforced this point, writing that "we have never held that moral
disapproval, without any other asserted state interest, is a sufficient
185. Id. at 562.
186. Id. at 567.
187. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-11 (1974) (per curiam)
(suggesting that activity may be "sufficiently imbued with elements of
communication to fall within the scope of the First and Fourteenth Amendments" if
there is both "[a]n intent to convey a particularized message" and when "in the
surrounding circumstances the likelihood [is] great that the message would be
understood by those who viewed it"); see also Bar-Navon v. Brevard Cnty. Sch. Bd.,
290 F. App'x 273, 275 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (noting that it "is not disputed"
that "the First Amendment protects symbols and conduct that constitute 'symbolic
speech"').
188. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
189. Id. at 582.
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rationale under the Equal Protection Clause'9o to justify a law that
discriminates among groups of persons."l 91
Although Cohen dealt with freedom of expression and is not
directly cited in Lawrence, it nonetheless arguably provides the
foundational logic upon which Kennedy's reasoning in Lawrence is
rooted. In Cohen, the Court specifically rejected California's argument
that it could jettison the word "fuck" from the public vocabulary under
the "general assertion that the States, acting as guardians of public
morality, may properly remove this offensive word from the public
vocabulary."'92 Justice Harlan wrote in Cohen that "so long as there is no
showing of an intent to incite disobedience to or disruption of the draft,
Cohen could not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, be punished for asserting the evident position on the
inutility or immorality of the draft his jacket reflected."19 3 In other words,
more than thirty years before the Court in Lawrence rejected the
government's asserted interest in policing public morality in the realm of
sexual conduct engaged in by adults, it rejected in Cohen the
government's interest in policing public morality in the realm of speech
engaged in by adults.
Furthermore, prior to Justice Kennedy's emphasis in Lawrence
upon what he dubbed as "an autonomy of self,"1 94 Cohen laid the
groundwork for this vein of thought when Justice Harlan wrote that "the
Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the
individual."1 9s While Paul Robert Cohen's "taste and style"1 96 of speech
may have constituted what Harlan dubbed an "annoying instance of
individual distasteful abuse of a privilege" 97-namely, the First
Amendment freedom of speech-tolerance of such individual expression
190. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in
relevant part, that "[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
191. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
192. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22-23 (1971).
193. Id. at 18.
194. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562 (majority opinion).
195. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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is "not a sign of weakness but of strength." 98 This echoes the late
University of Pennsylvania Professor C. Edwin Baker's argument that
speech must be protected not only "as a means to a collective good but
because of the value of speech conduct to the individual." 99 More fully
explicated, as Professor Edward J. Eberle writes:
Intrinsically, free speech is valuable because it
promotes and reflects human personality and is an
essence of human dignity. Autonomy to think,
listen, and speak for oneself is essential to a free
and self-determining human being. Free speech
theorists have captured aspects of this justification
for expression as resting on a basis of individual
self-fulfillment, self-realization, or liberty.200
Viewed in this light, Cohen's speech was important to realizing
his own identity as an anti-draft and anti-war protestor, regardless of
whether he influenced society's views on the merits, or lack thereof, of
either issue. Likewise, John Geddes Lawrence and Tyron Garner, the
appellants in Lawrence, realized their own sexual identity by being
allowed to engage in the intimate conduct of their choice. Put more
directly, Cohen involved self-realization through words, while Lawrence
involved self-realization through conduct.
A close reading of Cohen also reveals that, at its heart, it is a
decision about individual dignity and the recognition that we live in a
diverse society that requires toleration of others. In particular, the Court
observed that freedom of expression "is powerful medicine in a society
as diverse and populous as ours" 201 and that tolerating a strong dose of it
"comport[s] with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon
,202
which our political system rests." Justice Harlan's bold assertion that
"the State has no right to cleanse public debate to the point where it is
grammatically palatable to the most squeamish among us"203 demands
198. Id.
199. C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25
UCLA L. REv. 964, 966 (1978).
200. Edward J. Eberle, Cross Burning, Hate Speech, and Free Speech in
America, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953, 960-61 (2004) (footnotes omitted).
201. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 25.
that we tolerate the speech of others, even if it makes us, as he put it,
"squeamish." 204
Thus, while Cohen taught American society to tolerate diverse
expository choices, Lawrence taught American society to tolerate diverse
sexual lifestyle choices, even if they are not, to quote Cohen, "palatable
to the most squeamish among us." 205 Ultimately, if Cohen is viewed as a
case about autonomous decision-making in the use of sexually explicit
expression that might offend some people and, in turn, Lawrence is
viewed as a case regarding autonomous decision-making in engaging in
sexually explicit conduct that also might cause offense, then Justice
Kennedy ably and artfully bridges them in Lawrence by recognizing that
"[1]iberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of
thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct."20 6
With these seven Supreme Court opinions illustrating the use
and influence of Cohen on the High Court's free speech jurisprudence
since 1971 in mind, the article now turns to uses of Cohen by lower
courts.
B. Cohen's Influence on Selected Lower Court Rulings
The influence and impact of Cohen have been, as this section of
the article suggests, powerful in both very recent cases and older lower
court opinions. Several examples below help to demonstrate this point.
1. Illustrating the Shock Value in First Amendment Jurisprudence
Thirty-nine years after the Supreme Court handed down its
ruling in Cohen v. California, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit made good use of it to support its 2010 ruling in
207
Ostergren v. Cuccinelli. The case centered on a privacy rights
advocate named Betty Ostergren, who posted on her website Virginia
land records that she had lawfully obtained via a remote-access Internet-
based system and that revealed individual Social Security numbers
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 538, 562 (2003) (emphasis added).
207. 615 F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 2010).
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("SSNs").208 Although she easily could have blacked out or redacted the
SSNs and thus protected individuals from possible identity theft,
Ostergren sought "to publicize her message that governments are
mishandling SSNs and generate pressure for reform." 20 9 As she explained
in an affidavit, "seeing a document containing an SSN posted on my
website makes a viewer understand instantly, at a gut level, why it is so
important to prevent the government from making this information
available on line [sic]."21 She added "that merely explaining the problem
lacks even 'one-tenth the emotional impact that is conveyed by the
document itself, posted on the website."'211
In ruling in favor of Betty Ostergren's First Amendment right to
post lawfully obtained SSNs, the Fourth Circuit rejected Virginia's
argument that requiring fractional redaction of SSNs by Ostergren before
she posted the land records was the appropriate way to strike a balance
212between free speech and informational privacy concerns . The appellate
court reasoned that "partial redaction would diminish the documents'
shock value and make Ostergren less credible because people could not
tell whether she or Virginia did the partial redaction." 2 13 It added that
"[Lt]he unredacted SSNs on Virginia land records that Ostergren has
posted online are integral to her message. Indeed, they are her message.
Displaying them proves Virginia's failure to safeguard private
information and powerfully demonstrates why Virginia citizens should
be concerned." 2 14
208. Id. at 266-68.
209. Id at 269.
210. Id. (quoting Joint Appendix at 89, Ostergren v. Cuccinelli, 615 F.3d 263
(4th Cir. 2010)).
211. Id.
212. Id at 271. Daniel Solove and Paul Schwartz observe that "[i]nformation
privacy concerns the collection, use and disclosure of personal information.
Information privacy is often contrasted with 'decisional privacy,' which concerns the
freedom to make decisions about one's body and family." DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL
M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY AND THE MEDIA 1 (2008). "[D]ecisional privacy," in
contrast, is "the right to make certain profoundly personal decisions, such as those
concerning contraception, abortion, or marriage, free from government intrusion."
Amy Gajda, Judging Journalism: The Turn Toward Privacy and Judicial Regulation
of the Press, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1039, 1045 (2009).
213. Ostergren, 615 F.3d at 272 n.8 (emphasis added).
214. Id. at 271.
39
The lynchpin of logic underlying the Fourth Circuit's privileging
of what it called the "shock value" 215 of speech came directly from
Cohen. In particular, the appellate court wrote:
Virginia argues that Ostergren could redact several
digits from each SSN and still express her message.
But the First Amendment protects Ostergren's
freedom to decide how her message should be
communicated. Although wearing a jacket bearing
the words "Boo for the Draft" rather than "Fuck the
Draft" may convey the same political critique, the
Supreme Court found that the government cannot
216
prohibit the more offensive version.
The Fourth Circuit then went on to directly quote Justice
Harlan's recognition in Cohen in that "words are often chosen as much
for their emotive as their cognitive force." 2 17 The bottom line for the
Fourth Circuit, then, is that while Betty Ostergren could have chosen
more tame and discreet ways of informing the public about her concerns
with Virginia's online land record system that did not jeopardize privacy
rights, the Supreme Court's decision in Cohen left that decision up to her
and not to the government.
In addition to the Fourth Circuit, other courts have used Cohen to
emphasize that the emotive function of speech deserves First
218
Amendment protection.
215. Id at 272 n.8.
216. Id. at 271 n.8.
217. Id. at 272 n.8 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971)).
218. See, e.g., Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 212-13 (3d Cir. 2003)
(citing Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25-26); Bazaar v. Fortune, 476 F.2d 570, 576 (5th Cir.)
(finding "relevant" the fact that the High Court in Cohen "refused to sanction the
view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual
speech, has little or no regard for that emotive function which, practically speaking,
may often be the more important element of the overall message sought to be
communicated"), aff'd as modified, 489 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam);
Tollett v. United States, 485 F.2d 1087, 1096 n.20 (8th Cir. 1973) (describing the
dangers of self-censorship that can stifle "original thought and expression of
utilitarian emotions," and quoting Cohen, in support of this assertion, for the
proposition that "'words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their
cognitive force"' (quoting Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26)) (emphasis added)).
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2. Demonstrating Statutory Vagueness Problems and
Illustrating Related Problems of Governmental Line Drawing
Beyond protecting the shock value in speech, Cohen 's reasoning
that "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric"219 provides the logic that
allows courts today to strike down state statutes similar to the one under
which Paul Robert Cohen was prosecuted and convicted in California.
For instance, in January of 2011 a superior court judge in Orange
County, North Carolina, declared unconstitutionally vague a state statute
providing that "[i]f any person shall, on any public road or highway and
in the hearing of two or more persons, in a loud and boisterous manner,
use indecent or profane language, he shall be guilty of a Class 3
misdemeanor."220 In a "three-page ruling,"221 Judge Allan Baddour
reasoned that "[t]here is no longer any consensus, if there ever was, on
what words in the modern American lexicon are 'indecent' or 'profane.'
A reasonable person cannot be certain before she acts that her language
is not violative of this law, and it is therefore unconstitutionally
vague." 222
Cohen's more general lessons about the difficulty of government
line drawing when it comes to deciding what speech is protected and
what speech falls outside the ambit of First Amendment protection was
illustrated in a 2010 opinion by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Alvarez.22 3 The case centered on the
constitutionality of the Stolen Valor Act of 200522 that, as the Ninth
Circuit wrote, "imposes a criminal penalty of up to a year of
imprisonment, plus a fine, for the mere utterance or writing of what is, or
219. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25.
220. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-197 (2009), invalidated by State v. Elabanjo, No.
09 CRS 54172 (Orange Cnty. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 2011), http://www.acluofnc.org/files
/1 %205%2011 %200rder/o20Granting%20Motion%20to%20Dismiss.pdf.
221. See Anne Blythe, Cursing Ban Struck Down, NEWS & OBSERVER, Jan. 8,
2011, at Al, available at http://www.newsobserver.com/2011/01/08/906506/
cursing-ban-struck-down.html.
222. Tom Breen, Judge Strikes Down NC Ban on Public Profanity, Assoc.
PRESS ONLINE, Jan. 8, 2011, http://cnsnews.com/news/article/judge-strikes-down-nc-
ban-public-profanity.
223. 617 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, No. 11-210, 2011 WL
3626544, (Oct. 17, 2011).
224. 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2006) invalidated by Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198.
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may be perceived as, a false statement of fact - without anything
more."2 25 In particular, the Act provides, in relevant part, that:
[w]hoever falsely represents himself or herself,
verbally or in writing, to have been awarded any
decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the
Armed Forces of the United States, any of the
service medals or badges awarded to the members
of such forces, the ribbon, button, or rosette of any
such badge, decoration, or medal, or any colorable
imitation of such item shall be fined under this title,
226
imprisoned not more than six months, or both.
In September 2007, Xavier Alvarez was charged in federal court
with, according to the U.S. Department of Justice's official press release
in the matter, "falsely claiming to have been awarded the Congressional
Medal of Honor."22 7 Alvarez responded by challenging the validity of the
Stolen Valor Act under the First Amendment.228
In seeking to uphold the Act, the government argued that "there
is no protection for false statements of fact unless it can be shown, in a
particular case, that there should be." 229 In rejecting this approach, which
would have shifted and foisted the burden on the speaker to prove that
speech merits protection rather than on the government to prove that it
does not deserve shelter,230 the two-judge majority of the Ninth Circuit
reasoned:
Placing the presumption in favor of regulation, as
the government and dissent's proposed rule does,
would steadily undermine the foundations of the
First Amendment. In Cohen v. California, the
225. Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1200.
226. 18 U.S.C. § 704 (b) (2006) invalidated by Alvarez, 617 F.30 1198.
227. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Water District Board Member
Charged With Lying About Receiving Congressional Medal of Honor (Sept. 26,
2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/cac/Pressroom/pr2007/121.html.
228. Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1201.
229. Id. at 1203.
230. See id. at 1204 (observing that "under the government's proposed
approach, it would effectively become the speaker's burden to prove that his false
statement should be protected from criminal prosecution. That approach runs
contrary to Supreme Court precedent.").
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Court rejected state regulation of profanity because
"the principle contended for by the State seems
inherently boundless. How is one to distinguish this
from any other offensive word?" 403 U.S. 15, 25,
19 S. Ct. 1780, 29 L. Ed. 2d. 284 (1971). This case
is to that extent analogous. How, based on the
principle proposed by the government, would one
distinguish the relative value of lies about one's
receipt of a military decoration from the relative
value of any other false statement of fact?231
Resting in part upon this logic, as well as on another citation to
Cohen for the proposition that society sometimes must put up with an
"annoying instance of individual distasteful abuse of a privilege" 232 like
233
free speech, the majority ultimately held the Act unconstitutional.
3. Influencing the Scope of the Fighting Words Doctrine
234
Cohen also has proven useful to many lower courts when
defining speech that constitutes "fighting words" 235 that fall outside the
231
scope of First Amendment protection. In Cohen, the High Court
described fighting words as "those personally abusive epithets which,
231. Id
232. Id. at 1205 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1971)).
233. Id at 1218.
234. See infra note 249 (providing examples of such cases using Cohen to help
articulate the parameters of the fighting words doctrine).
235. The United States Supreme Court wrote nearly seventy years ago:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These
include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and
the insulting or 'fighting" words-those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
the peace.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (emphasis added).
236. See Edward J. Eberle, Hate Speech, Offensive Speech, and Public
Discourse in America, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1135, 1138 (1994) (describing
fighting words as "a category of expression historically unprotected by the First
Amendment").
43
when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common
knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction."2 37 It added in
Cohen that fighting words encompass only speech amounting to "a direct
personal insult." 2 38  Mere offensive speech standing alone-the
deployment of the word "fuck" in a political context-therefore did not
rise to the level of fighting words in Cohen, as the Court reasoned that
"[n]o individual actually or likely to be present could reasonably have
regarded the words on appellant's jacket as a direct personal insult."239
Cohen 's interpretation and constraint on the aging and
controversial240 fighting words doctrine most recently played a key role
in the 2011 decision of the Supreme Court of Arizona in In re Nickolas
S.241 The case pivoted on whether a minor who "insulted a teacher with
derogatory and offensive words (and was suspended from school for
doing so)" 2 42 could be adjudicated as a delinquent under an Arizona
statute that makes it a crime to "'knowingly abuse[]' teachers [and] other
school employees." 24 3 Observing that "when pure speech is involved, the
statute applies only to 'fighting words,"'244 the Arizona high court
framed the issue before it as "whether this case involves fighting words
as defined by the United States Supreme Court." 245
Directly citing Cohen, the Supreme Court of Arizona observed
that the U.S. Supreme Court "has held that fighting words must be
directed personally to an addressee and that words may not be proscribed
merely to maintain a suitable level of discourse or because they may tend
237. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See generally Burton Caine, The Trouble with "Fighting Words
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire is a Threat to First Amendment Values and Should be
Overruled, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 441, 444 (2004) (criticizing the fighting words
doctrine as "a category so ill-conceived that not once in the ensuing sixty-two years
has the United States Supreme Court upheld a conviction based on it" and
contending that "[t]here is no constitutional basis for denying protection to fighting
words, either alone or as a subcategory of speech claimed to be unworthy of First
Amendment protection").
241. 245 P.3d 446 (Ariz. 2011).
242. Id. at 447.
243. Id. (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15-507 (2009)).
244. Id.
245. Id.
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to provoke a violent reaction."246 It also cited Cohen for the proposition
that "[t]he underlying rationale for the fighting words doctrine is that
some speech may be suppressed because it would likely provoke an
immediate violent reaction by the person to whom it is addressed." 247
Applying these principles, the Supreme Court of Arizona concluded that
the speech at issue in In re Nickolas S. did not rise to the level of fighting
words.248
Other courts too have used Cohen to articulate the parameters of
fighting words.249 For instance, when U.S. Magistrate Judge Kenneth P.
Neiman was called upon in 2004 in Levine v. Clement2 to define and
apply the fighting words doctrine, he wrote, "as in Cohen, the simple use
of obscenities did not transform Plaintiffs 'offensive' speech into
fighting words." 2 5 1 In this case, defendant Deborah Clement, an officer
with the Holyoke, Massachusetts, police department, arrested Robert
Levine on disorderly conduct charges after Levine allegedly "used the
246. Id. at 451 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20, 23-24 (1971)).
247. Id at 452.
248. Id. In particular, the Arizona high court reasoned:
Nickolas vulgarly insulted the teacher from about ten feet
away by calling her a "fucking bitch"; he repeated this insult
and also shouted "stupid bitch" while leaving the classroom,
and he then again shouted "fucking bitch" in the hallway while
the teacher was watching him from the classroom door.
Considering the circumstances in which Nickolas uttered his
words, we do not believe that his insults would likely have
provoked an ordinary teacher to "exchange fisticuffs" with the
student or to otherwise react violently.
Id.
249. See, e.g., Cannon v. City & County of Denver, 998 F.2d 867, 873 (10th
Cir. 1993) (finding Cohen "instructive" on clarifying the scope of the fighting words
doctrine); Ricker v. Weston, No. CIV.A. 99-5879, 2000 WL 1728506, at *14 (E.D.
Pa. Nov. 21, 2000), rev'd, 27 F. App'x 113 (3d 2004) (quoting Cohen on fighting
words); Commonwealth v. Welch, 825 N.E.2d 1005, 1017 (Mass. 2005) (citing
Cohen in interpreting the sweep of the fighting words doctrine); People v.
Prisinzano, 648 N.Y.S.2d 267, 273 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. 1996) (citing Cohen as standing
for the point that "even insulting or offensive words may have expressive value and
are not 'fighting words' unless uttered as direct personal insults likely to provoke
violent reaction in the ordinary citizen").
250. 333 F. Supp.2d 1 (D. Mass. 2004).
251. Id at 5.
words 'fuck' and 'fucking"'5 when disparaging the Canadian flag as it
was being displayed during the City of Holyoke's annual St. Patrick's
253
Day parade in 2003. Levine sued, alleging a violation of his First
214
Amendment right of free speech. Levine asserted that his remarks
were intended "as a comment on the lack of Canadian support for U.S.
military action in Iraq."2 55 The political opinions were, as in Cohen, not
directed at any individual; the only reaction was "that some 'people'
stopped looking at the parade and looked at [Levine], asking him to be
quiet[,]"256 and "[h]e offered no physical resistance after he was
informed he was under arrest., 257 Officer Clement thus had to concede
that Levine's speech did not fit within the category of fighting words
and, in turn, that the disorderly conduct arrest based upon Levine's
-258
speech was improper.
4. Illustrating That Context is Key for Speech Protection and
The Right to be Free From Unwanted Speech
In addition to using Cohen to flesh out the fighting words
doctrine, lower courts have deployed it to demonstrate that the context in
which speech occurs makes a key difference on whether or not it is
259
protected. As described earlier, the Supreme Court in Cohen observed
that privacy expectations and, in particular, a privacy right to avoid
contact with unwanted speech depends directly on where the speech
260
takes place.
252. Id. at 3. Levine denied that he used the words, but he did not dispute it for
purposes of the summary judgment motion before Magistrate Neiman. Id. at 3 n.2.
253. Id. at 2-3.
254. Id. at 2.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 3.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 5.
259. Supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
260. Justice Harlan wrote for the Cohen majority:
[P]ersons confronted with Cohen's jacket were in a quite
different posture than, say, those subjected to the raucous
emissions of sound trucks blaring outside their residences.
Those in the Los Angeles courthouse could effectively avoid
further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting
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In 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
in Anderson v. Spear261 cited Cohen to support the proposition that "[tihe
Supreme Court generally has resisted the invitation to extend to public
spaces the limited right of individuals to be left alone inside their homes,
even when the messages may prove to be offensive to the listener." 2 62
The Sixth Circuit observed that in Cohen, the Court held that "the risk of
offense was not a basis for restricting the ability of a speaker to wear a
jacket adorned with a vulgar message in a courthouse, but rather that
those offended may overt [sic] their eyes." 26 3 The appellate court thus
characterized Cohen as "instructive regarding the limits of the right to be
left alone . . . .'" Applying these principles to the constitutionality of
Kentucky laws affecting the distribution of literature near polling places,
the Sixth Circuit wrote in Anderson:
If the right to be left alone provides an insufficient
basis for the states to restrict the display of
profanity in the courtroom or Nazis marching down
residential streets occupied by objecting holocaust
265
survivors, then the State's interest in assuring
that voters are not subjected to any unwanted
campaign speech alone cannot be a sufficient basis
266
to regulate that clearly protected speech.
their eyes. And, while it may be that one has a more substantial
claim to a recognizable privacy interest when walking through
a courthouse corridor than, for example, strolling through
Central Park, surely it is nothing like the interest in being free
from unwanted expression in the confines of one's own home.
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1971).
261. 356 F.3d 651 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, Stumbo v. Anderson, 543 U.S. 956
(2004).
262. Id. at 660.
263. Id. The author of this article has added the "[sic]" notation in the text
corresponding to this footnote because the actual quotation from Cohen refers not to
"overting" their eyes, but to "averting their eyes." Cohen, 403 U.S. at 2 1.
264. Anderson, 356 F.3d at 661.
265. This is a reference to the High Court's ruling in Nat'l Socialist Party of
Am. v. Vill. of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977).
266. Anderson, 356 F.3d at 661.
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Thus, as in Pacifica Foundation and Fraser, the appellate
court in Anderson used Cohen to illustrate that the protection speech
receives-and the right of the audience to be free from unwanted
expression-is necessarily a contextually driven inquiry.
5. Offensiveness Does Not Equal Obscenity
One of the initial items that Justice Harlan addressed in Cohen
269
was whether or not the speech at issue was obscene. While the word
270
"fuck" may have a sexual meaning of copulation, the High Court
quickly dismissed the possibility that Paul Robert Cohen's jacket was
obscene, reasoning:
Whatever else may be necessary to give rise to the
States' broader power to prohibit obscene
expression, such expression must be, in some
significant way, erotic. It cannot plausibly be
maintained that this vulgar allusion to the Selective
Service System would conjure up such psychic
stimulation in anyone likely to be confronted with
Cohen's crudely defaced jacket.271
This line of logic proved instructive for the United States Court
of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit in McNamara v. Moody.272 The case
pivoted on the censorship by prison officials of inmate John P.
McNamara's letter to his girlfriend that "dealt in large part with
McNamara's discontent with the prison mail censorship system, but it
also charged that the mail censoring officer, while reading mail, engaged
in masturbation and 'had sex' with a cat." 2 73
267. 438 U.S. 747 (1978). See supra Part II.A.1.
268. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). See supra Part II.A.2.
269. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
270. See Christopher Fairman, Fuck, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1711, 1719 (2007)
(observing that "[fluck is a highly varied word. While its first English form was
likely as a verb meaning to engage in heterosexual intercourse, fuck now has various
verb uses, not to mention utility as a noun, adjective, adverb, and interjection.")
(citations omitted).
271. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20 (citation omitted).
272. 606 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1979).
273. Id. at 623. The part of the letter that landed McNamara in trouble stated:
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In examining whether or not the censorship of the letter violated
the First Amendment speech rights of inmate McNamara, the Fifth
Circuit considered the argument of prison official J.C. Moody that the
274 275
letter was obscene. Citing and quoting from Cohen, the appellate
court wrote about the letter, "Vulgar it is; obscene it is not."2 76 It added
that judged by Cohen's standard, "the inmate's letter in this case is not
obscene." 27 7
In addition to this list of five different ways in which Cohen has
influenced lower court opinions over the past four decades, the case also
has been used by the judiciary to support: (1) the proposition that "the
First Amendment protects more than oral expression[;]" 278 (2) the idea
that "the government may not restrict speech because there may be a
1 wish I could write w/o some perverted dung-hole reading my
words, but such is not the case. It is really a shame that there
are those who have such a blah ! life that they must masturbate
themselves while they read other people's mail. I don't think
the guy is married; however, one of the freeman told me the
other day that he has a cat and that he is suspected of having
relations of some sort with his cat. If the shoe fits him, watch
him blush the next time we see him. I'll point him out to you
and you can laugh at him. "Look, honey. There goes that
pervert who has sex with a cat and masturbates while reading
other people's mail." This is what I think of him. These are my
thoughts, and I am entitled to them.
Id. at 623 n.2.
274. Id. at 624.
275. The appellate court quoted Cohen's observation that:
[w]hatever else may be necessary to give rise to the
States' broader power to prohibit obscene expression,
such expression must be, in some significant way,
erotic. . . . It cannot plausibly be maintained that this
vulgar allusion to the Selective Service System would
conjure up such psychic stimulation ....
Id. at 624 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971)).
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Higher Taste v. City of Tacoma, 755 F. Supp. 2d. 1130, 1134 (W.D.
Wash. 2010) (citing Cohen, 403 U.S. 15); see also Sefick v. City of Chicago, 485 F.
Supp. 644, 648 n.11 (N.D. 111. 1979) ("The concept of constitutionally protected
speech has been expanded beyond the bounds of mere oral expression.") (citing
Cohen, 403 U.S. 15)).
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negative reaction to that speech by members of the public[;]" 279 (3) the
argument that the government may not use the pretext of targeting some
speech in order to quash critical viewpoints with which it disagrees; 2 80
and (4) the principle that "[t]he use of the word 'fuck' displayed to the
public is protected speech" 281 and, more generally, that "the Constitution
279. San Diego Minutemen v. Cal. Bus., Transp. & Hous. Agency's Dep't of
Transp., 570 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1252 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (citing Cohen as used by the
Ninth Circuit in Sammartano v. First Judicial Dist. Ct., 303 F.3d 959, 969 (9th Cir.
2002)).
280. For instance, a federal appellate court in 1983 considered whether a
Mennonite was improperly indicted for failure to register for the draft because he
exercised his First Amendment right of free speech in a letter to the Selective
Service in which he not only confessed to the agency his intent not to register, but
also expressed his disagreement with the draft under religious and political grounds.
United States v. Schmucker, 721 F.2d 1046, 1048 (6th Cir. 1983), vacated, 471 U.S.
1001 (1985). The appellate court, quoting Cohen, wrote:
"[W]e cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid
particular words without also running a substantial risk of
suppressing ideas in the process. Indeed, governments might
soon seize upon the censorship of particular words as a
convenient guise for banning the expression of unpopular
views." Similarly in the present case, the defendant claims-
with some support in the record-that the government is
forbidding criticisms of itself under the guise of prosecuting a
form of confessional words.
Id. at 1051 (quoting Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26). The Sixth Circuit found Cohen to be:
analogous to the instant case. There the prosecutors argued that
the slogan was obscene and contained "fighting" words and
therefore was not entitled to protection. The accused argued
that the slogan had a political meaning, that he used the
obscenity to dramatize that meaning. The court held that the
two characterizations merged and that the context of the
prosecution suggested a strong inference that the state brought
the case in part because of the political meaning of the slogan.
This case lends itself to similar analysis. The prosecution
argues "confession," and the accused argues political and
religious "protest."
Id.
281. Stone v. Juarez, No. CIV 05-508 JB/RLP, 2006 WL 1305039, at *13 (D.
N.M. Apr. 23, 2006) (citing Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26).
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protects vulgar language and profanity"282 and "speech that many, even a
majority, find offensive." 283
In summary, Section A has illustrated Cohen's influence on
seven major Supreme Court rulings, while Section B has demonstrated
Cohen's effect, in multiple ways, on many lower court rulings. With this
in mind, the article now concludes by addressing some of the ways in
which Cohen may be affected in the digital age.
CONCLUSION
In the New York Times' obituary for Justice Harlan, who passed
away at age seventy-two, less than seven months after Cohen was
decided, Professor Yale Kamisar described Harlan's majority opinion in
the case as "probably one of the great opinions ever written on freedom
of expression."28 4 And although the case has its detractors, apparently
285
including Justice Thomas, Kamisar was not alone in this glowingly
positive assessment of Harlan's opinion. Professor William Van Alstyne
captures well the essence of Cohen when he calls it:
a distinctly "American" freedom of speech case -
strong, uncompromised, committed to a risk-taking
(rather than a risk-averse) First Amendment,
confident in the end as against the more collapsed
and constrained regimes in countries with weaker
first amendments than ours. The opinion exhibits a
confidence in central principles of free
speech . . 286
282. State v. Poe, 88 P.3d 704, 715 (Idaho 2004).
283. Dible v. City of Chandler, 515 F.3d 918, 933 (9th Cir. 2008) (Canby, J.,
concurring).
284. Lesley Oelsner, Harlan Dies at 72; On Court 16 Years, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec.
30, 1971, at Al.
285. In 2001, Justice Thomas wrote, "I remain baffled that this Court has
extended the most generous First Amendment safeguards to filing lawsuits, wearing
profane jackets, and exhibiting drive-in movies with nudity, but has offered only
tepid protection to the core speech and associational rights that our Founders sought
to defend." Fed. Election Comm'n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533
U.S. 431, 466 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
286. William Van Alstyne, Remembering Melville Nimmer: Some Cautionary
Notes on Commercial Speech, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1635, 1657 (1996).
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This article has demonstrated the multiple ways in which this
confident, American free speech opinion has been employed over the
past forty years by the U.S. Supreme Court and lower judicial bodies.287
The question now becomes whether the case will continue to have such
influence and whether the principles that it teaches about freedom of
expression will remain viable in the coming decades.
This is a particularly intriguing question on the fortieth
anniversary of the case in light of President Barack Obama's January,
2011 speech at the University of Arizona in the aftermath of the killing
288of a federal judge and wounding of a U.S. Congresswoman. Much
initial media coverage involved the issue of whether the killings should
be blamed on the heated rhetoric of politicians like erstwhile Alaska
Governor Sarah Palin and right wing talk show hosts.289 As a front page
287. See supra Part II.
288. See generally Shailagh Murray & Sari Horwitz, Congresswoman Shot in
Tucson Rampage: Judge is Among 6 Slain, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 2011, at Al
(describing the shootings).
289. As columnist Paul Jenkins wrote:
The shots were still echoing as the left rushed to politicize the
carnage and blame Republicans and conservatives in an
attempt to curb guns and free speech. It was Sarah Palm's fault
they said, or her silly map targeting Giffords' district. Or Rush
Limbaugh's "hate" speech, or Glenn Beck's. Or high-capacity
magazines, or guns in general. It was talk radio or TV - even
if the suspected shooter's friends said he never watched
television or listened to radio; that he could not have cared less
about politics. It was heated political rhetoric (never from the
left, mind you), or the DREAM Act's failure to win
congressional approval. Or maybe the moon was full. But most
important, Republicans did it.
Paul Jenkins, Left Exploits Tragedy; Only One Person is to Blame, ANCHORAGE
DAILY NEWS, Jan. 15, 2011, at B7. See Ross Baker, Let's Be Careful with Cause and
Effect in Tucson, USA TODAY, Jan. 11, 2011, at 1OA (observing that "[t]hose who
blame the news media - specifically the 24-hour news channels and their
incendiary commentators - will also be able to make a plausible case that
inspiration for [Jared] Loughner can be found in the words of people such as Glenn
Beck or his radio counterpart Rush Limbaugh"); Dana Milbank, A McKinley
Moment?, WASH. PosT, Jan. 11, 2011, at A21 (calling the heat placed on both Sarah
Palin and Glenn Beck after the Arizona shooting as "well deserved. Both are finally
being held to account for recklessly playing with violent images in a way that is
bound to incite the unstable."). See generally David M. Herszenhom, After Attack,
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New York Times article put it the day after the shooting, the tragedy
"quickly focused attention on the degree to which inflammatory
language, threats and implicit instigations to violence have become a
steady undercurrent in the nation's political culture." 290
In light of this attention, President Obama stated that:
at a time when our discourse has become so
sharply polarized - at a time when we are far too
eager to lay the blame for all that ails the world at
the feet of those who happen to think differently
than we do - it's important for us to pause for a
moment and make sure that we're talking with each
other in a way that heals, not in a way that
wounds.29 1
The President went on to say that what "we cannot do is use this
tragedy as one more occasion to turn on each other,"292 and added that
"[i]f this tragedy prompts reflection and debate - as it should - let's
make sure it's worthy of those we have lost. Let's make sure it's not on
the usual plane of politics and point-scoring and pettiness that drifts
away in the next news cycle." 2 9 3
While President Obama counsels for what amounts to self-
censorship in tone and tenor of political discourse, Cohen provides the
antithetical framework that allows for the type of heated and offensive
Focus in Washington on Civility and Security, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2011, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/20 11/01/10/us/politics/1Ocapital.html (observing that "[flor
Democrats, the challenge is how to voice their suspicion that overheated rhetoric,
especially from the right, is leading to threats and actual violence without being
perceived as blaming Republicans for what may have been the act of a lone
madman," and describing both parties in the days after the attack as beginning "a
wrenching process of soul-searching about the tone of political discourse and
wonder[ing] aloud if a lack of civility had somehow contributed to the bloodshed in
Tucson").
290. Carl Hulse & Kate Zernike, Bloodshed Puts New Focus on Vitriol in
Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2011, at Al.
291. Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the President
at a Memorial Service for the Victims of the Shooting in Tucson, Arizona (Jan. 12,





political rhetoric on issues of public concern that arguably pervades and
permeates punditry and discourse today. Indeed, Cohen and, later,
294
Johnson, make it clear that when it comes to political expression, we
must tolerate offensive, disagreeable and shocking speech and
viewpoints.
This means, of course, that only a voluntary subscription to the
unwritten rules of a more civilized form of discourse will realize
President Obama's laudable attempt to quell heated political vitriol
today. To state the obvious, the Supreme Court will not suddenly
overrule Cohen now simply because the executive branch wants to see a
mellowing of political debate. Certainly with the right of the free
expression may come an ethical obligation to use it responsibly, but the
Supreme Court has long recognized that abuse of the privilege is
inevitable and generally must be tolerated.295 With Cohen, as Amherst
College Professor Hadley Arkes wrote back in 1974, the Court "resolved
for the first time that the preservation of civility was simply not
substantial enough as an interest of the state to warrant any restrictions
on speech that had even the slenderest pretense of being 'political."'
29 6
Cohen was forged during the era of a controversial war and
during a period of cultural and generational turbulence, coming out of the
297
1960s' free speech movement. If free speech is to mean anything
294. See supra Part II.A.4.
295. As the Supreme Court eloquently wrote eighty years ago:
Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of
everything, and in no instance is this more true than in that of
the press. It has accordingly been decided by the practice of
the States, that it is better to leave a few of its noxious
branches to their luxuriant growth, than, by pruning them
away, to injure the vigour of those yielding the proper fruits.
And can the wisdom of this policy be doubted by any who
reflect that to the press alone, chequered as it is with abuses,
the world is indebted for all the triumphs which have been
gained by reason and humanity over error and oppression ... ?
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 718 (1931).
296. Hadley Arkes, Civility and Restriction of Speech: Rediscovering the
Defamation of Groups, 1974 SuP. CT. REv. 281, 315 (1974) (emphasis added).
297. In fact, when the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the case, the
New York Times observed that the Court had agreed to "confront the 'dirty words'
issue that has arisen frequently in connection with youth protests." High Court to
Rule on Aid to Church Tied Colleges, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1970, at A18 (emphasis
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today-yet another time when the nation is involved in at least two
different controversial wars, one geographically bounded in
Afghanistan298 and the other temporally protracted against an enemy
299
called terrorism -then Cohen's principles will serve well those who
object to U.S. involvement in either or both of those conflicts.
As for the lasting impact of the case in the next forty years, it
must be remembered that Cohen hinged, in large part, on the context of
the speech in question. As Stanford University Professor William
Cohen has observed, Cohen merely settled the proposition that "a law is
unconstitutional if it punishes the use of profanity in all public places at
all times. It has not resolved the standards applicable to time, place, and
manner control of the public use of profanity."30 1 There are, Professor
Cohen suggested, "nearly [an] infinite number of imaginable factual
situations" 302 across which that trio of variables-time, location and
manner/mode of expression-can vary.
Paul Robert Cohen, of course, conveyed his speech via a very
primitive medium-the written word on an article of clothing-
compared with today's high-tech, digital world. Courts now will need to
sort out how Cohen affects the use of profanity on issues of political
concern when the speech is posted on the Internet, transmitted via tweets
and texts and bandied about on cable talk shows that are free from the
strictures of the FCC's indecency regime.303 New technologies have only
added). See generally James A. Hijaya, The Free Speech Movement and the Heroic
Moment, 22 J. AM. STUD. 43 (Apr. 1988) (providing an overview of the free speech
movement in Berkeley, Cal.).
298. See generally Eric Schmitt, Taliban Fighters Appear Quieted in
Ajghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2010, at Al (providing a relatively recent report
on the U.S. military's ongoing involvement in Afghanistan).
299. See generally Thom Shanker, After Decade of War, Top Officer Directs
Military to Take Stock ofltself, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2011, at A20 (observing that the
U.S. "military enters its 10th year of war since the Sept. 11 attacks").
300. See supra Part II.A. 1 -2 (describing how context was key in Cohen, and
illustrating how the Supreme Court contrasted the factual context of Cohen with the
context in both Pacifica Foundation and Fraser).
301. Cohen, supra note 16, at 1614 (emphasis added).
302. Id. at 1603.
303. Federal Communications Commission, Obscenity, Indecency & Profanity
-Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.fcc.gov/guides/obscenity-indecency-
profanity-faq (last visited Oct. 30, 2011) (noting that "the FCC has enforced the
indecency and profanity prohibitions only against conventional broadcast services,
55
multiplied the number of "imaginable factual situationsm to which
Professor Cohen referred more than two decades ago. Those
technologies are also in the hands of new users-minors, not simply
adults-which adds to the complexity surrounding the influence Cohen
will have in the future.
Finally, for the twin purposes of both humor and scholarly
integrity, it is important to note that not all courts that have cited Cohen
to illustrate legal propositions actually have correctly understood the
facts of the case. Notably, in 2000 a federal district court in Arkansas got
the pivotal fact of the case wrong, writing that Cohen centered on a case
involving an individual who, "while in a public building, had the words
'f-k you' displayed on his clothing."305 Alas, had Paul Robert Cohen's
jacket been emblazoned merely with those two words, standing alone
and devoid of any anti-government, dissenting political commentary
regarding a controversial war and conscription, the U.S. Supreme Court
might never have heard the case because, to return full circle to Justice
Harlan's fine opening phrase in the opinion, it might have been "too
inconsequential to find its way into our books.,
306
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(emphasis added).
304. Cohen, supra note 16, at 1603.
305. Nichols v. Chacon, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1104 (W.D. Ark. 2000).
306. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 15 (1971).
FIRST A MENDMENT LA W RE VIE W56 [Vol. 10
